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IntroductIon
In this text, I will examine the main trains of thought in the nar-
rative of the historical memory of the Russian Federation’s special 
services, which demonstrate the attempts to reconcile the tradi-
tions of the Tsarist-era services with those of the Soviet services. 
I will proceed from the assumption that the history of the special 
services is part of the history of the state apparatus, and more 
broadly, of the state’s political systems. In this context, the work 
of Russian historiographers focuses not only on combining these 
two, in many respects contradictory identities of Russia – the Tsa-
rist and the totalitarian – but above all on the creation of parallels 
between the historical and contemporary situations. This is be-
cause the historical legitimisation of the services is an important 
factor that gives legal validity to the current ruling elite, whose 
roots largely lie in the KGB, and which operates under the condi-
tions of a new system of governance based on state capitalism.
This linking of the traditions is a derivative of the logic and conti-
nuity, imposed from above, of the Russian state, which also lay at 
the basis of the historical-cultural standard establishing the ‘ca-
nonical’ version of Russian history which is compulsory for the 
authors of history textbooks. The paradox is that the Russian his-
toriography of the special services locates their origin in the first 
Soviet security service: the All-Russian Commission for Counter-
Revolution and Sabotage (Всероссийская Чрезвычайная Комиссия 
по Борьбе с Контрреволюцией и Саботажем, commonly abbrevi-
ated to ЧК – CheKa). The activities and structures of the CheKa 
and its successors were subordinated to the logic of the revolution, 
which broke with the pre-Bolshevik traditions of the state. Out of 
necessity, the contemporary Russian historiography of the spe-
cial services is a continuation of Soviet historiography, artificially 
forced into a new historical-civilisational framework. Its contro-
versial and superficial reinterpretations cover both the Chekist 
tradition and the legacy of the Tsarist security services. The civi-
lisational context, however, permits a depiction of the historical 
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political-social processes as being a phase in the Russian state’s 
struggle against internal challenges and external threats, which 
the special services have effectively repelled.
The interpretation and reinterpretation of the history of the Rus-
sian special services embedded in the historical-cultural context 
draws upon categories such as: the Russian spirit, the Russian Or-
thodox community, conservative values, the mission of uniting 
a multinational and multi-confessional society, the community of 
experiences, the experiences of wartime, the spirit of service to 
the state, the dictatorship of law, and others. Historical memory 
treated in an ideologised way (in the works of the theoreticians 
of information warfare, this is described as the so-called histori-
cal weapon) has become an important, if not an essential element 
of the manipulative technologies used to emphasise the distinc-
tiveness of Russian civilisation and the perennial civilisational 
confrontation between East and West. From this viewpoint, the 
Russian services seem in fact to be more appropriately described 
by the use of categories used in systemic methodology: central-
ised authorities, the authoritarian system of government, the po-
lice state, strategic culture, et al.
This text consists of three parts. The first outlines the foundation 
of the institutional memory of the Russian special services, the 
ideology of ‘Chekism’. The second part describes elements from the 
history of the Tsarist services being used today to demonstrate the 
continuity of the historical memory of the Russian special servic-
es. The third is a critical summary of the specific image of the spe-
cial services’ past as a victorious battle against their opponents.
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theses
1.	 The history of the special services and the ideas which or-
ganise it in the symbolic sphere are an important part of the 
reflection on their contemporary role and position. Over the 
centuries, the secret services defined Russia’s relations with 
the outside world, shaped the domestic situation, and influ-
enced the fate of the people and the nations that made up the 
Russian and Soviet empires. Many generations of their sub-
jects and citizens were raised in the cult of state security: in 
this way, the services’ negative image (as a powerful machine 
of repression) was washed out of public awareness, and their 
successes and contributions to the modernisation and build-
ing of the country’s power were emphasised. This kind of em-
phasis on the services’ unique role and importance is a well-
tried instrument of social manipulation. Its return has been 
marked by the axiom, disseminated since the mid-1990s, that 
‘a strong Russia must have strong special services’.
2.	 The contemporary reinterpretations of the history of the Rus-
sian and Soviet special services are aimed at obliterating the 
memory of the police state. There is no tradition of democratic 
institutions in Russian history, and any attempts to change the 
government or conduct independent politics were and still are 
considered a crime against the state. For this reason at least, the 
authorities have always had to seek support from the special ser-
vices. These, in turn, as a pillar of state power, not only defended 
the interests of the state, but also controlled its ‘uniform spaces’: 
the political, economic, social, administrative, legal, informa-
tional, spiritual, and even the physical spaces of historical con-
sciousness. This is the main mark of the distinctness of the Rus-
sian special services (in the mental and organisational spheres, 
in their modus operandi) from their counterparts in the West.
3.	 Running to some extent against the aforementioned the-
sis about the continuity of the Russian state, as well as the 
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continuity of the methods and experiences of the Tsarist and 
Soviet services, the Russian special services of today derive 
their origin from the first Soviet security institution, the Che-
Ka. In the symbolic space, this imposes radical, usually cha-
otic reinterpretations of Chekist ideology. Their perception in 
society is carefully supervised: individual elements are modi-
fied, some are removed, and new ones appear – depending on 
the needs of the authorities. One significant manifestation of 
this was the departure from the image of the services as the 
elite of society (the ‘new nobility’) created at the beginning of 
Vladimir Putin’s first term (2000) in favour of an image as ‘de-
fenders of the fatherland’ towards the end of his third term 
(2012-2018).
4.	 The services’ departmental historiography, as represented by 
a fairly numerous group of scholars, treats history as a con-
venient platform for PR and the historical legitimisation of the 
contemporary services. The positive image created of them 
is in line with the expectations of the authorities. The self-
stereotype which is disseminated therein – that is, the set of 
attributes attributed to their professional group, their sym-
bolic image of themselves – also serves additional purposes: 
shaping a sense of the uniqueness of Russian service person-
nel, creating the desired capabilities, attitudes and values, and 
building intergenerational bonds. This image thus fulfils the 
following functions: providing identity, integration, didactics 
and socialisation.
5.	 President Vladimir Putin’s manner of exercising power has 
been characterised as ‘Chekistocracy’, that is, the power of 
a nomenklatura whose roots lie in the former KGB (which is 
sometimes mistakenly described as the seizure of power by 
the so-called power structures); the contemporary historiog-
raphy of the special services thus also performs the function 
of legitimising the regime. The linking of the imperial and So-
viet heritage – the rehabilitation of the past, which emphasises 
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the imperative of the power structures’ stability, and bridges 
the historical and cultural differences of the multi-ethnic and 
multi-faith society of the Russian Federation – is part of a wid-
er, long-term process of building a ‘new’ heritage of Russian 
political and ideological models, subordinated to the strategic 
goals of its policy, among which the dominant objective was 
and still is to maintain its role as a superpower.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
18
10
I. ‘A new type of chekIst’: pAtrIots And 
defenders of the homelAnd
The celebration of the centenary of the founding of the All-Rus-
sia Special Committee for Counter-Revolutions and Sabotage has 
become a convenient opportunity to display the new essence of 
Chekism. The day of the CheKa’s creation (20 December 1917) is 
officially a holiday commemorating the employees of the security 
organs, commonly known as Chekist’s Day. It is celebrated by the 
contemporary descendants of the CheKa: the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal 
Security Service, and the Main Board for the President’s Special 
Programmes. This institutional continuity is particularly empha-
sised by the FSB and SVR, which have had their own histories 
since the times of Feliks Dzerzhinsky. They thus perpetuate the 
Chekists’ self-stereotype, which – like any ideological construct 
– is a simplified, positively and emotionally evaluated image of 
themselves as a professional group. At the same time, the need 
to raise the level of their self-assessment is met by demonstrat-
ing the centuries-long tradition of the Russian security system. 
This is manifested particularly in the anniversary issues of the 
magazine “FSB – for and against”. In an article entitled ‘Unchang-
ing values’1, Mikhail Burienkov, a Ph.D. in psychology, presented 
a contemporary, somehow universal suite of the desired values  of 
an officer (high professional ethics, solidarity with his profession-
al group, loyalty to the state, legalism, humanity, a comprehen-
sive education, and excellent, timely specialist and psychological 
training). The features postulated (courage, bravery, dedication, 
heroism, and honour) were embedded in the ethos and history of 
the special services, and identified with a patriotic attitude. “Ob-
serving these principles”, as he writes, “has always favoured the 
successes of our national services at the various stages of histori-
cal development in Russia”.
1 М. Буренков, Неизменные ценности, “ФСБ: за и против” № 1 (47), 2017: 
osfsb.ru/materialy/k-100-letiyu-organov.../neizmennye-tsennosti/
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In order to confirm this thesis, the author of this article recalls 
the names of “the outstanding theoreticians and practitioners 
of Russian intelligence and counterintelligence”: Stanislav Tur-
lo2, Nikolai Batyushin3 and Sergey Zubatov4. By thus expanding 
a perspective of the tradition of the patriotic attitudes of Russian 
officers which reaches beyond the revolutionary period of 1917, 
the author highlights another pillar of this tradition: service to 
the state. Here, service to the state is identified with defence of 
the country: the author has granted the officers of the security 
organs the honourable title of defenders of the fatherland, which 
previously had mainly been reserved for the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation. Defender of the Fatherland Day is celebrated 
on 23 February as a separate celebration of the professional army.
The qualities of patriotism (sacrifice and dedication) and defence 
of the homeland, as the two main distinguishing features of the 
personality profiles and motivations of the officers of the Rus-
sian special services, were also the main message of the anniver-
sary publications, including the interviews given last December 
by Aleksandr Bortnikov5, the head of the Federal Security Ser-
vice (FSB) and Sergei Naryshkin6, the head of the Foreign Intel-
ligence Service. The latter placed particular emphasis on the high 
2 An officer of the CheKa and OGPU from 1918-1924, author of the books 
Шпионаж [Spying] and Красная контрразведка [Red counterintelligence], 
first published in 1924, and later repeatedly republished. Arrested in 1938 on 
charges of counter-revolutionary activity; died in an NKVD labour camp.
3 A long-time head of the intelligence division in the Warsaw Military District, 
and considered to be one of the co-founders of Russian military intelligence 
– see below.
4 Presented here as the creator of the Russian school of espionage; for more on 
Zubatov, see below.
5 ФСБ расставляет акценты, „Российская газета”, 19 December 2017, https://
rg.ru/2017/12/19/aleksandr-bortnikov-fsb-rossii-svobodna-ot-politichesko-
go-vliianiia.html
6 Глава СВР Сергей Нарышкин: Мне всегда нравился памятник Дзержинскому, 
„Московский комсомолец”, 19 December 2017: http://www.mk.ru/poli-
tics/2017/12/19/glava-svr-sergey-naryshkin-mne-vsegda-nravilsya-pamy-
atnik-dzerzhinskomu.html
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intellectual level of Russia’s intelligence personnel “combined with 
a healthy, soldierly discipline”, as well as “decency and dedication, 
the ability to work in stressful situations”. In his opinion, Dzer-
zhinsky was “the leading activist in the first stage of the construc-
tion of the young Soviet republic. He played a huge role in creating 
a native intelligence service. He was also the author of many social 
and economic projects”. Recalling the historical trauma of violence 
and civil war, Naryshkin expressed the hope that “Russian society 
will never again be divided into Whites and Reds”.
According to the FSB’s head, today’s officer is distinguished by his 
professionalism, legalism, a special bond with society and social 
trust. Bortnikov also stressed the importance of creativity, as 
well as the intergenerational bond among the ranks of the secu-
rity personnel: “The current generation of officers intelligently 
uses the experience accumulated by their predecessors in their 
operational work, develops it and introduces innovations. It will 
be passed on to a new generation of officers, which will secure the 
continuity of the process of improving our ministry’s work”.
President Putin has also modified his message to his officers. He 
had previously characterised them as people who “treat the ser-
vice of the state as a holy matter”; during the anniversary celebra-
tions, he stated that “Chekists are the real patriots and defenders 
of the homeland, raising a permanent barrier of security against 
foreign interference in our social and political life”.
The annual rituals accompanying Chekist’s Day suggest that the 
Russian state is not only equipping its special services with the 
necessary tools, but is also surrounding them with a special, sa-
cral, ideological aura. The idea is to make the services aware that 
the whole of Russia stands behind them, including the ruling elite, 
with its roots in the KGB, and which also nurtures the Chekist tradi-
tions. This intricately woven stereotype also serves to build up Rus-
sian society’s respect for and consent to the specific methods which 
the secret services employ. One could say: in today’s militarised and 
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mobilised Russia, everyone is defending the besieged fortress that 
is Russia; the heirs of the Chekists defend it not only out of patriotic 
duty, but do so in a competent manner, using methods sanctified 
by centuries-old traditions. This attitude should be interpreted in 
three ways: 1) as a mechanism for building cohesion and closeness 
within the officers’ ranks, 2) an appreciation of the special services 
as a key element of the system of state management created by Pu-
tin, and 3) emphasising their role in the current mobilisation strat-
egy of legitimising Putin’s authoritarian regime.
1. Continuity and modification
It is obvious that the features and values  of Russian officers as 
presented are independent both of their own experiences (many 
examples of their actions which are doubtful from the point of 
view of ethics and legalism can be witnessed on a daily basis), and 
of the image of these experiences in Russian popular opinion, in 
which work in the security organs is associated not so much with 
ideological but with material motivations7: exceptional social sta-
tus, the right to use violence with impunity, and the possibility 
of resolving difficulties in everyday life. Nor is there any deeper 
reflection upon the mutually exclusive nature of the old and new 
elements of contemporary Chekism. The current officer class is 
far from leading the ascetic lifestyle of Dzerzhinsky; his people 
were also, above all, bearers of the cult of the revolution. Soviet 
propaganda perpetuated not only the myth of “pure hands, hot 
hearts and a cold mind”: the Chekists claimed to be a “new type of 
security organ”, which was to differ radically from both their pre-
decessors and their Western counterparts. This purely ideological 
thesis was absurd, but it has been repeated for decades up until 
today. The Chekist ethos was also a product of the struggle against 
7 This is indirectly demonstrated by a set of novelty items prepared for Chek-
ist's Day. For this occasion in 2017, the Russian company Caviar produced 
a golden iPhone X smartphone with a portrait of Dzerzhinsky, and the in-
scription ‘100 years of the CheKa’ on a crocodile leather case. See https://
lenta.ru/news/2017/12/18/phone/
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the imperial idea. From the middle of the 19th century, it was based 
on a triad of autocracy, Orthodoxy and the peasant spirit; and it 
emphasised the separateness of the ‘Russian soul’, i.e. the sepa-
rateness of Russia from the West.
The fact that the ‘Russian soul’ (the model of Russian spirituality) 
was an ideological project of the Tsarist state, emphasising a sys-
tem of values  and development model that was separate from the 
West, was well understood by its opponents, just as they under-
stood the instrumental role of the Okhrana, which was a constant 
target of attacks in their ideological war with the Tsarist state. For 
example, Leon Trotsky, in a St. Petersburg newspaper article from 
1882 appealing for “a solution to the workers’ question in a purely 
Russian spirit,” unmasked as “ultra-reactionary a nationalistic 
newspaper closely related to the Ochranka”:
“It has long been known that the ‘purely Russian spirit’, for which 
the patent is issued by the Police Department, combines three el-
ements: police autocracy, police Orthodoxy and the police peas-
ant spirit. I believe, however, that – in view of the current mood 
among the working masses – the Orthodox priest is too anachro-
nistic and discredited a figure to be sent to the workers’ quarters 
bearing the olive branch of ‘social peace’. Mr. Zubatov’s agents 
are more useful here. (...) In St. Petersburg, as before in Moscow, 
‘legal’ meetings of workers will be organised, during which Zu-
batov’s men will – on the one hand – try to reconcile what is ir-
reconcilable (autocracy and the proletariat), and on the other – to 
persecute workers speaking against the ‘purely Russian spirit’. As 
a result, the discussions which started at legal meetings will end 
up in the Department of the Okhrana”8.
In 1917, the stigmatised methods of the police state were taken 
over by the Bolshevik security apparatus, the CheKa. From the 
8 Л. Троцкий, Зубатовщина в Петербурге, „Искра”, nr 30, 15 December 1902, 
http://www.magister.msk.ru/library/trotsky/trotl996.htm
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beginning, Soviet Russia was governed by decrees, and the one-
man decisions of the political leaders became binding on all or-
gans of state power. The slogan of the ‘dictatorship of the proletar-
iat’ was a form of ideological protection concealing the unlimited, 
force-based rule of the Bolsheviks. Over time, especially during 
the civil war and the Second World War, the Bolsheviks began to 
appeal to an eternal Russian messianism, propagating the slogans 
of ‘the historical mission of the Russian nation’ which in the twen-
tieth century was to export revolution and establish Communism 
in the world. Nevertheless, they still contrasted the ‘spirit of pro-
letarian internationalism’ with the ‘purely Russian spirit’.
The Chekists’ contemporary heirs, however, strongly reject the 
idea of  a revolution that could threaten the KGB elite currently 
wielding power. The myth of the revolution which was prevalent 
in Soviet Russia was deconstructed long ago. In the official narra-
tive, the ‘colour revolutions’ represent chaos, destabilisation, and 
the evil imposed on Russia by the West. This explains the rather 
modest celebrations of the centenary of the CheKa: these coincid-
ed with the centenary of the revolution, which did not find any re-
flection at all at the official level. The revolutions of 1917 and 1991, 
as having led to the disintegration of the state, have already been 
described by Putin as the two greatest geopolitical catastrophes 
of the 20th century. Moreover, the Kremlin fights other people’s 
revolutions ideologically, such as the Orange and Dignity revolu-
tions in Ukraine and the Georgian revolution. The Chekists of to-
day have also restored the ‘Russian spirit’ by building the ‘Russian 
world’, something which is apparently more just than the world of 
the West.
Chekism as an ideological construct has many other drawbacks: 
as it served the Communist state, it liquidated ‘capitalist relics’ 
and fought capitalism as its class enemy, while today’s Russia 
is actually engaged in building state capitalism. Revolutionary 
Chekism abolished all constraints, social (the gentry, the Rus-
sian aristocracy) and cultural (breaking with the Church as the 
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basis of tradition), whereas contemporary Chekists emphasise 
their attachment to the Orthodox Church and the titles of the 
nobility9. Another important shortcoming is the memory of re-
pression, which still remains vigorous. This leads to ambiguous 
situations: in October 2017, President Putin unveiled the imposing 
Monument to the Victims of Repression (which has been called 
the ‘Russian Wailing Wall’), while in December of that same year 
the head of the FSB Aleksandr Bortnikov relativised the repres-
sion, underestimating the number of their victims based on de-
partmental statistics10.
The persistence of the Chekist myth as a ‘foundational’ myth 
should be linked to the institutional memory of the current ruling 
elite, the ‘KGB generation’: it is their emblem (the symbolic shield 
and sword of power) which appears on the emblem of the FSB. All 
the Soviet secret services have drawn upon the CheKa as their 
founding myth. Various means have been used to sustain it: from 
pop culture, through media and art, to literature and official his-
toriography. The Chekist cult has had its own pantheon of saints, 
its own iconography, its own separate rituals legitimising the po-
litical police, as well as its boss in the Kremlin. Sometimes, as in 
9 The noble titles have been recognised by Princess Maria, the heiress of the 
imperial Romanov family. Together with the Order of Saint Anna, such titles 
have been granted, among others, to the head of the SVR Sergei Naryshkin, 
the former head of the SVR Aleksandr Lebedev, the head of the FSO Evgeny 
Murov, and the former head of the FSB Sergei Stepashin. See http://www.
saintanna.ru/?lang=rus&id=60
10 This is evidenced by the protest by professors of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, as well as by journalists and writers, against the FSB head Alek-
sandr Bortnikov’s relativisation of the repression in his interview on Chek-
ist’s Day on 19 December 2017 (ФСБ расставляет акценты, op cit.). For more 
on this subject, see e.g. Российские ученые написали письмо с критикой 
интервью Бортникова, „Ведомости”, 22 December 2017, https://www.ve-
domosti.ru/politics/news/2017/12/22/746278-rossiiskie-uchenie-napisali; 
Такой подход является надругательством над памятью бесчисленных 
погибших. Литераторы и журналисты высказали свой протест из-за 
слов Бортникова о репрессиях, „Интернет газета Знак”, 25 December 2017, 
https://www.znak.com/2017-12-25/literatory_i_zhurnalisty_vyskazali_
svoy_protest_iz_za_vyskazyvaniy_bortnikova_o_repressiyah
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the final years of the KGB’s existence, the more radical methods of 
action were avoided and the aggressive propaganda was replaced 
by softer forms. ‘Miss KGB’ contests were held, and literary & film 
competitions were announced. The emphasis on the Chekists’ 
unique role has led to the consolidation of a kind of national secu-
rity cult among the general public11. This cult is constantly being 
renewed: from among the experiences of the past, those desirable 
from the point of view of the authorities’ current needs are se-
lected; inconvenient events are rejected as “ideological garbage”12. 
The icons which appear in the pantheon of the Russian services 
are constantly being replaced: the ‘great reformer’ Yuri Andropov 
has been replaced by a figure identified with Russia’s neo-imperi-
al policy, Yevgeny Primakov; Lavrenty Beria and Sergei Zubatov 
have been restored to grace. Russian symbols also change their 
meaning easily. If the measure of the Chekism of Dzerzhinsky’s 
time was the proletarian ethic (according to which ‘Red terror’ 
was a reaction to ‘White terror’), that of today is supposedly based 
on Orthodox ethics, which – as it is emphasised – binds Russian 
society together (and which claims that all power comes from 
God).
Chekism, like every ideology, exploits a mythologised version 
of history. Its durability as the basis for the cult of security is 
a derivative of its adaptive ability, i.e. its ability to be modified. 
The legendary (in the literal sense) traditions of the Russian 
services are also an important element of the intergenerational 
transmission of experience. This is because the services were al-
ways assigned a key role in the system: that of the praetorian, the 
bodyguard, the new nobility, the revolution’s sword of retribution 
11 For more on this topic, see Дж. Федор, Традиции чекистов от Ленина до 
Путина. Культ государственной безопасности, Петербург 2012, http://
readli.net/traditsii-chekistov-ot-lenina-do-putina-kult-gosudarstvennoy-
bezopasnosti/
12 An expression used by Putin during a meeting in January 2014 with the 
authors of the concept of the new historical standard. See http://expert.
ru/2014/01/17/iz-uchebnika-istorii-vyibrosyat-ideologicheskij-musor/
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– that is, the predominant element in the strategies to legitimise 
the system. It is enough to recall the celebration of Chekist’s Day 
in 2000; the then head of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, justified 
their key role with the following words: 
“The appearance of the Chekists in the Old Square13, in the Krem-
lin and in the regions (...) was dictated by the necessity of life. It 
was essential to let fresh blood into the administrative body of 
Russia, to launch a spirit of service to the state (...). Chekists are 
people of service, the modern new nobility; thinking, educated 
people, who understand the logic of the development of interna-
tional and domestic political events, of the ripening contradic-
tions and threats. They understand perfectly that a return to the 
past is impossible, they understand the need for the country to 
develop based on a rational combination of liberal and traditional, 
conservative values”14.
During Putin’s last term, liberal values have been discredited in 
the public space as being an element of Western ideology and the 
so-called intransigent internal opposition to Putinism, i.e. as an 
obstacle to the authoritarian system. Today the Kremlin and the 
special services display anti-Western and anti-liberal identities; 
they proclaim imperial conservative values, while at the same 
time re-evaluating the traditions of the period of the CheKa and 
its successors. The current strategy for legitimising Putin’s power 
is being dictated by a return to the experience of Stalin’s times 
and his mobilising variant of development.
13 Старая Площадь, Staraya Square the seat of the Russian government.
14 Н. Патрушев, День чекиста, „Комсомольская правда”, 20 December 2000.
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II. the ImperIAl trAdItIon: A dIctAtorshIp 
of the heArt, or A dIctAtorshIp of feAr?
There are further examples of the manipulation of historical 
memory and the content of fixed stereotypes which draw upon the 
legacy of the Tsarist special services as cited by historiographers. 
More: we find many examples of similar manipulation within the 
heritage itself. According to the authoritarian political-ideolog-
ical constitution of the Russian Empire, all power rested in the 
hands of the monarch. He was the highest instance in the state, 
he was the fount of the law, and his decisions (decrees and proc-
lamations) were carried out with the help of a gradually expand-
ing state apparatus, including the Tsarist police services, the size 
of which increased as new threats and challenges to Tsardom in-
creased. For example, the rise of the Decembrists (1825) resulted 
in the appearance of the Third Department of the Imperial Chan-
cellery, which the modern historiography of the Russian services 
treats as a modern service, modelled on the Western counterparts 
that had appeared in Europe during the Napoleonic era. Howev-
er, while the tasks of the European police involved carrying out 
investigations and transferring them to the judiciary, the Third 
Department had its own judicial powers, and could arrest and ex-
ile suspects without a court sentence. Today, it is characterised as 
the first operational and investigative service in political matters, 
and as the information service to which all data on crimes against 
the Tsarist authorities obtained by the police and the gendarmes 
of the War Ministry were to be sent.
The creation of the political police was accompanied by the cen-
tralisation of power: the Third Department, also called the Su-
preme Police, was intended to serve as a centre for the coordina-
tion of the state security forces (the Gendarmes’ Corps, the palace 
security services, the Cossack troops and others). Its founder and 
long-time head Alexander Benckendorff, a German from Estonia, 
entered the history of the Russian special services not only as 
a forerunner of the Russian police state, but also as an ‘engineer of 
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social affairs’ (as he described himself). The legend, as recorded by 
Tsarist historians, says that when General Benckendorff turned 
to Nicholas I for instructions, his Imperial Majesty held a hand-
kerchief in his hand. He supposedly presented it to the head of 
the newly-formed Supreme Police with the words: “Here is my 
only order. Wipe away the tears of my people with this handker-
chief”. This legend was quoted by Burienkov, in whose version the 
Tsar said: “The more of my people’s tears you wipe away with this 
handkerchief, the more faithfully you will have served my pur-
poses”. This alleged historical fact was interpreted unequivocally 
by Burienkov: 
“In	this	way	the	first	person	in	the	state	underlined	the	hu-
manitarian	 purpose	 of	 political	 investigations	 in	 Russia:	
to	secure	the	stability	of	the	functioning	of	state	power.	Its	
weakening,	as	we	know,	results	in	internal	conflicts,	poten-
tial	civil	war,	attempts	to	seize	the	country	by	other	states,	
which	brings	about	ruin	and	enormous	casualties	among	the	
people,	as	well	as	the	loss	of	national	identity”15.
Another kind of manipulation involving the projection of the maj-
esty of the ‘first person in the state’ onto the services subordinate 
to him was used by Benckendorff in a note justifying the creation 
of the new service. In it he suggested the creation of an elite centre 
in St. Petersburg, served by a network of agents who would “cover 
the entire Empire, they themselves will be subject to strict disci-
pline, and at the same time they will arouse fear and respect. The 
moral authority of their superior will inspire them.”16 In turn, his 
instructions for the employees of the Third Department include 
sentiments that were also expressed during last year’s Chek-
ist’s Day celebrations: “Your noble feelings and principles will 
15 М. Буренков, Уроки русских спецслужб, „ФСБ: за и против”, 3, 2016, p. 62: 
https://www.osfsb.ru/upload/iblock/668/6681728c6d648412be26601d23
ad6530.pdf
16 From Ch. A. Ruud, S. Stepanov, Strach. Tajna policja carów [Fear. The secret 
police of the Tsars], Warsaw 2001, p. 32.
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undoubtedly help you gain the confidence of all the estates, and 
then your vocation, supported by universal trust, will achieve its 
goals and bring obvious benefit to the state”17.
The direct heirs of the Third Department have displayed similar 
abilities to deceive reality. Nikolai Loris-Melikov – a distinguished 
general who served in the Russian-Turkish war (1877-8), the initia-
tor of a thorough reform of the Tsarist security organs, including 
the creation of the Okhrana (1881) – was known as the ‘viceroy’, 
and his term in the interior minister’s office was called ‘the dicta-
torship of the heart’18, which was allegedly characterised by less 
violent methods than those used during the Benckendorff era. 
However, history teaches us that Fontanka Street in St. Petersburg 
(the headquarters of the Third Division, and then the Okhrana) 
aroused the same emotions as the later Lubianka did in Moscow.
These reforms were a response to the crisis of absolute power af-
ter the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, and were intended to 
improve the inefficient state security services. They were based 
on the concentration of all intelligence information from the gen-
darmerie, police and other civilian (the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs) and military structures (the War Ministry) in the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, as well as on coordinating their operational 
and investigative activities, a task entrusted to the secret Special 
Department, the Okhrana’s intelligence and counterintelligence 
headquarters, as it is known today. (In fact, the intelligence and 
counterintelligence functions were not separated until the Okhra-
na’s dissolution in 1917; eventually they were subordinated to its 
policing function). The reforms also had a purely pragmatic aspect: 
the Tsarist government had been surprised by the tumultuous 
development of the terrorist movements and needed emergency 
measures to combat them, as well as to limit their destructive 
17 After А. Калганов, В поисках истины, „ФСБ: за и против”, 3, 2016: https://
www.osfsb.ru/materialy/zhurnal-fsb-za-i-protiv
18 Ruud, Stepanov, op. cit., p. 75.
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influence on public opinion. The democratic changes in the West 
forced by revolutions also had an equally destructive impact.
The gradual expansion of the network of the Okhrana’s district 
departments subordinated to one centre (according to data from 
1907, it had 31 provincial and 8 regional departments) led to the 
creation of a police state. Politics was recognised as the domain 
of the state and its senior officers; any unauthorised interference 
was a crime punishable by law. The enforcement of this princi-
ple was entrusted to the Police Department and the Gendarmes’ 
Corps, which were given the right to inspect, arrest, question and 
exile guilty parties or those suspected of political activity. The Po-
lice Department obtained the right to refuse to issue a certificate 
of ‘right-thinking’ to the citizen, without which his life would be 
significantly limited; among other things, he could not study at 
universities or be employed in public, state or other institutions. 
The Police Department also supervised all kinds of cultural activi-
ties and approved the statutes of public associations. The Police 
Department and the Gendarmes’ Corps were not subject to super-
vision by the judicial authorities; they were also excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the civil administrations in which they oper-
ated. Thanks to various instruments of repression, such as sur-
veillance, deportation to Siberia and penal servitude, the politi-
cal police apparatus isolated the ‘wrong-thinking’ from the rest 
of society. Without the consent of the censor’s office, no book or 
magazine could be published in Russia or imported from abroad. 
The Minister of Internal Affairs had the right to declare a state of 
increased security in any part of the empire, suspending ordinary 
rights and institutions, and to subject the inhabitants of such an 
area to the competence of the military authorities.19
This	 briefly	 outlined	 period	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Russian	
secret	 services	 enjoys	 the	 clear	 sympathy	 of	 their	 contem-
porary	historiographers.	Particular	attention	is	paid	to	the	
19 R. Pipes, Rosja carów [The Russia of the Tsars], Warsaw 2006, p. 321.
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Gendarmes’	Corps	and	the	Okhrana;	much	work	has	been	car-
ried	out	on	them	in	recent	times.	The	common	conclusion	is	as	
follows:	the	precursors	of	the	contemporary	Russian	services	
were	imbued	not	only	with	a	reforming	spirit,	but	also	with	
the	Russian	idea,	which	from	the	rule	of	Nicholas	I	was	‘the	
mission	to	defend	the	highest	interests	of	the	state’. The model 
example of a creative officer-reformer is Sergei Zubatov, the long-
time head of the Okhrana’s Moscow district, who in recognition 
of his outstanding merits was next appointed head of the Special 
Department, i.e. to its headquarters in St. Petersburg. He owed his 
successes to recognising human weaknesses and his skilful ma-
nipulation of them, as well as to his more humane treatment of his 
victims compared to the Okhrana’s other officers.
1. The ‘Zubatovshchina’: a significant redefinition
There was a one-sided and schematic picture in Soviet historio-
graphy of the period when Sergei Zubatov ran the secret service, 
known in Russian as the ‘Zubatovshchina’. Sergei Zubatov was 
presented as the ‘gravedigger of the revolution’, i.e. the creator 
of a ‘police socialism’ who was engaged in the struggle against 
the revolution. On contemporary historical websites, however, 
Zubatov’s image has acquired many hues: he is presented as an 
outstanding reformer of the Okhrana, the creator of the Rus-
sian school of espionage, an official of outstanding organisational 
skills, active, entrepreneurial, with the reputation of a profes-
sional, and above all a state-runner who displayed absolute loy-
alty to the Tsar and the state/monarchy, who committed suicide 
at the news of Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication. We also read on Or-
thodox websites that he was the man who could have stopped the 
revolution and saved Russia.
The redefinition of the ‘Zubatovshchina’ problem has been reflect-
ed not only in specialist literature, but also in history textbooks 
and the publishers of encyclopedias, which means that the cre-
ated (official) historical message, as adapted to the needs of the 
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authorities’ current policy, is being addressed to the broader pub-
lic. In the latest historical dictionary, the ‘Zubatovshchina’ was 
described as “the policy of police socialism implemented by Sergei 
Zubatov, the head of the Moscow Department of the Okhrana (from 
1896) and the Special Section of the Police Department (1902-3). It 
consisted in the creation of legal workers’ organisations operat-
ing under secret police supervision, aimed at distracting work-
ers from their political struggle with autocracy, and directing the 
workers’ movement into the mainstream of economic demands. 
The	legal	workers’	organisations	carried	out	extensive	educa-
tional	and	cultural	activities	among	the	marginalised	layers,	
as	well	as	their	enculturation”20.
The ‘police socialism’ implemented by the Okhrana, a political ex-
periment involving the inclusion of the opposition into the politi-
cal system under the slogan of defending the interests of the mon-
archy (Zubatov legalised workers’ organisations and their trade 
unions under the direction of Okhrana agents; he also founded 
political parties, such as the Jewish Independent Workers’ Party, 
organised patriotic demonstrations, anti-SR and anti-socialist 
counter-propaganda, etc.), is not particularly well publicised to-
day, although the concept itself is not questioned, just as it was 
not questioned in the times of the Okhrana21. As an ideological 
construct, it did not make much sense: after all, Zubatov was sup-
posed to be fighting socialism. As he explained, “It was all about 
getting the confidence of the workers. The revolutionaries were 
20 А. Орлов, Н. Георгиева, И. Георгиев, История России: словарь-справочник, 
Москва 2011, http://nashol.com/2016061589685/istoriya-rossii-slovar-spra-
vochnik-orlov-as-georgieva-ng-georgiev-va-2011.htmlorgieva-ng-georgiev- 
va-2011.html
21 A student of Zubatov summed him up in the following way: “Zubatov's idea 
was right, and nothing new, but the way in which his cottage-industry police 
implemented it went beyond the competence of the ministry. For the profes-
sional labour movement, a national leader was not found at the right moment 
(...), the government did not display any understanding of the workers' is-
sue, nor any interest in it, nor any sense of raison d’état” (A. Спиридович, 
Записки жандарма, https://royallib.com/book/i_spiridovich /zapiski_gan-
darma.html).
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strong in their trustworthiness, and it was essential to take it 
from them at all costs”22. Zubatov believed that it was necessary 
primarily to use the services of the intelligentsia and the educated 
workers. “When the revolutionaries raised the alarm, out of fear 
of losing their monopoly of influence on the workers, they scared 
off the teachers (...). In order to preserve the workers’ organisa-
tions, there was nothing left to do but ask the religious intelligent-
sia for support”.
It must be noted that Zubatov’s experiment became the reason he 
was removed from his duties. His immediate superiors accused 
him of inciting strikes, and sent him to the provinces under sur-
veillance. He became the scapegoat for the wave of strikes in 1904, 
and then for the ‘bloody Sunday’ that led to the revolution of 1905.
Zubatov himself blamed this revolution on his agent, Father Ga-
pon, as well as the leadership of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
accusing it of running their agents incompetently. “After hand-
ing over the workers’ issue to Gapon, they rested on their laurels. 
Deprived of support in the confrontation with the St. Petersburg 
entrepreneurs, he began to act independently, out of control. This 
is how the idea of  handing over the workers’ petition directly to 
the tsar was born”23.
As mentioned, Zubatov’s school of espionage deserves wider pub-
licity today. These ‘schools’ were defined as courses lasting from 
3 to 6 months, during which the Okhrana’s policemen and agents 
were taught basic police skills and the principles of conspiracy, 
as well as techniques for fighting the ‘kramola’, the subversive ac-
tivity conducted by opponents of the monarchy. The most talented 
gendarmes were sent for internships to Zubatov’s Moscow school, 
which was considered to be the model. Zubatov was the initiator 
22 Былое 4, 1917, http://www.hrono.info/libris/lib_z/zubatovschina.php
23 Вестник Европы, том II, March 1906, pp. 432-436, http://www.hrono.ru/
libris/lib_z/zubatov_vestnik.php
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
18
26
of in-depth training: his interns were required to have a knowl-
edge of revolutionary literature and the history of the opposition 
movements. In Moscow, and then in St. Petersburg, he founded 
libraries in which specialist literature was kept, as well as forbid-
den books, campaign literature, work by the theoreticians of the 
labour movement, leaflets, etc. He hired professors from Moscow 
and Saint Petersburg Universities to train the gendarmerie, and 
also employed scientific experts. Following the example of West-
ern police forces, he implemented novel surveillance techniques, 
and organised files containing data on suspects, including pho-
tographs, fingerprint data, anthropological measurements, lists 
of nicknames, codenames and aliases. He introduced a system of 
safe houses, and above all a system of agents, which he divided 
into agents of the external service (the so-called filery – obser-
vation) and agents of the internal service (the so-called seksoty – 
from sekretniye sotrudniki, secret collaborators). He also organised 
the so-called flying branch of the filery, who were ready to operate 
in every corner of Russia, and if necessary abroad. To this end, 
sums of money necessary to purchase tickets and cover other op-
erating costs were deposited in, for example, safe deposit boxes in 
railway stations. He used a combination of observations by pedes-
trians and horse-riders to set up posts for filery working as coach-
drivers. Zubatov is credited with the principle of the strict protec-
tion of agents. Those guilty of leaking about them were punished 
in a demonstrative manner: the head of the Police Department, 
Aleksandr Lopuchin, who at that time helped journalists to ex-
pose the famous double agent Yevno Azef, was sentenced to five 
years’ exile in Siberia.
The Okhrana’s distinguishing features were its secret agents, its 
extensive use of paid informers, and the use of methods of provo-
cation which had been brought to perfection. The requirements to 
register suspects led to the organisation’s bureaucratisation: ac-
cording to an Interior Ministry circular from 1907, the measure 
of its effectiveness was not the number of ‘liquidations’ (proceed-
ings ending with the conviction of the suspect), but the number 
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of investigative proceedings initiated, which were also treated 
as a method of prevention, and the way in which agents were re-
cruited. The growing number of enemies of the regime, in turn, 
justified the need to expand the Okhrana, increase its funds and 
radicalise its methods.
The very reform that led to its creation was adopted with some 
ambivalence, and with outright hostility in the Gendarmes’ Corps 
and its staff, writes Spiridovich: 
“Only the youth who had been given access to interesting work 
were satisfied. The heads of departments, who had considered 
themselves gods, were offended. Their position in the eyes of the 
local administration and the police was diminished, because the 
funds allocated for the agency’s expenses passed to the newly ap-
pointed bodies. Above all, the staff saw the growing influence of 
the police in this reform. Some of the gendarmes departed from 
their subordination to the staff. To describe this group, the con-
temptuous terms ‘the department’s boys’ or ‘the protectorators’ 
were used”24.
2. Innovations in espionage activities
The methods developed by the Okhrana led to the rapid develop-
ment of Russia’s foreign espionage. Contemporary historians of 
the secret services portray General Nikolai Batyushin as the ex-
emplar of Tsarist Russia’s intelligence service. As a distinguished 
officer, he was delegated to the Nikolayev General Staff Academy, 
after which he was sent to the Warsaw Military District in 1901. In 
1905, he headed the military intelligence office in Warsaw. “This is 
what happened historically”, writes Gen. Aleksandr Zdanovich25, 
a former FSB spokesman and currently a leading representative of 
24 A. Спиридович, Записки жандарма, op. cit.
25 See the foreword to Н. Батюшин, Тайная военная разведка и борьба с ней, 
Moscow 2002, militera.lib.ru/science/batushin_ns/index.html
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Russian secret-service historiography, “on the western frontiers 
of Russia, in the Kingdom of Poland, on whose territory the War-
saw District was located, like a wedge thrust into the territories 
of two neighbouring states, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the 
first specialists of the [military intelligence and counterintelli-
gence] services were raised”. The foundations of the military in-
telligence and counterintelligence operations led from Warsaw 
were founded by his predecessor Nikolai Monkevich. According 
to Zdanovich’s findings, Monkevich and Batyushin were also the 
first Russian generals “from the special services”.
Zdanovich attributes excellent characteristics to Batyushin: “He 
was distinguished by his diligence, initiative, systematic opera-
tional thinking; he had broad specialist knowledge, which allowed 
him to take unconventional decisions”. One particular reason for 
this praise of Batyushin was his agent Alfred Redl, who provided 
the Russians with an operational plan in the event of war as well 
as many other documents from the Austro-Hungarian General 
Staff. Batyushin is also regarded as an outstanding practitioner 
and theoretician, whose book Тайная военная разведка и борьба 
с ней [Secret military intelligence and how to combat it] is a Rus-
sian contribution to the ‘global’ theory of intelligence and coun-
terintelligence which was developed after the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
Understandably, Zdanovich emphasises Batyushin’s counter-
intelligence successes, which were testified by the detection in 
1900-10 of “over a hundred and fifty foreign spies”. However, he 
notes that only 17 cases were taken to court. At all the trials Baty-
ushin acted as a prosecutor and military expert: the legal basis 
was very poor, and the act on espionage prepared at his initiative 
and under his guidance was only accepted by the Duma in 1912. In 
this context, it should be noted that the notorious legalism of the 
Russian services, which is based among others on announcing the 
legal acts related to them, has a long tradition.
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The active expansion of Russian espionage before the First World 
War is demonstrated by the statistics collected by Max Ronge, the 
head of intelligence of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff26. In 
1913, the Records Office selected about 6000 cases requiring in-
vestigation (in 1905 the figure was just 500), and 560 arrests were 
made (compared to 32 in 1905); nearly one-seventh of those arrest-
ed received a conviction. The espionage trials allow us a glimpse 
into the Russian intelligence system. The Austro-Hungarian in-
telligence study was directed from two centres, Kiev and Warsaw, 
from where intelligence activities against Germany were also 
coordinated. In Warsaw, Col. Batyushin’s house on Saski Square 
“housed the entire enterprise, employing many directors, depart-
ment managers, recruit agents, inspectors and women. The latter 
were most readily used as intermediaries and recruiters (...). The 
Russians, perhaps as a result of the relations prevailing in their 
domestic politics, possessed special talents. Batyushin’s recruit-
ers and intermediaries sometimes ran entire offices”.
In Ronge’s opinion, Batyushin’s spies worked flawlessly, although 
the equipment they used was too standardised. For example, 
everyone whose task was to reconnoitre fortifications was given 
an American pocket Expo camera, which unmasked them. The 
espionage work was focused on quantity, not quality: “As num-
bers were always of great importance to the Russians, Batyushin 
maintained a whole army of confidants, people offering accom-
modation, housekeepers and other helpers”.
One discovery for Ronge was the use of ‘spies in priests’ robes’. 
Moreover, he noted that their extensive use of methods of agita-
tion and propaganda was a speciality of the Russian services. Es-
pionage spread particularly in Galicia. Russia’s intelligence pene-
tration was adapted to local conditions: in Galicia, the pan-Slavist 
agitators had support from the Russophile Rusyns, who “saw their 
26 M. Ronge, Dwanaście lat służby wywiadowczej [Twelve years of intelligence 
service], Warsaw 1992, pp. 46-49.
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homeland in Russia, and their ruler in the Tsar, praying for him 
in churches built with Russian money”; in Bohemia and Moravia 
they based themselves on the support of advocates and propaga-
tors of anti-war movements. Czech agents were trained in Russia 
and then sent back to their home country, where they organised 
anti-war demonstrations. The methods of provocation used by the 
Tsarist services also involved getting anarchist and pacifist or-
ganisations to cause problems for the Austro-Hungarian monar-
chy. And not only that: in 1914 they brought about the separation 
of Galicia from the Austro-Hungarian empire.
At	 that	 time,	 Russia’s	 foreign	 intelligence	 activity	was	 not	
only	based	on	acquiring	information:	a	significant	part	of	its	
activity	already	 involved	 creating	political	movements	and	
events	which	were	desired	by	St.	Petersburg.	Both	military	
and	civil	 intelligence	were	 involved	 in	such	activities;	both	
were	subordinate	to	the	Special	Department	of	the	Okhrana.
Ronge’s observations are confirmed by General Batyushin in his 
book Secret military intelligence and how to combat it, published 
in exile (Sofia 1938). As Batyushin writes in the preface, it was 
“a modest response to the grumbling from Colonel Ronge caused 
by the persistent silence of Russia’s military intelligence”27. On 
the eve of World War II, Batyushin wished to draw attention to 
the “immense importance of the secret services both in peacetime 
and during war”, “to show the place of intelligence and its secret 
weapon – political propaganda”.
27 In 1930, Max Ronge published a book entitled Kriegs- und Industriespionage 
[War and industrial espionage]. A book on the role of intelligence, Geheime 
Machte [Secret forces], was also published in 1923 by Walter Nicolai, the head 
of intelligence of the German General Staff. Both books were translated into 
Russian and repeatedly republished. According to the findings of Russian his-
toriographers, Ronge and Nicolai met Batyushin in 1926 in Vienna. By the way: 
in 1945 Gen. Nicolai was abducted by the NKVD and taken to Moscow, where 
he died in 1947. [See О. Хлобустов, Разведка и контрразведка Первой мировой 
войны глазами асов шпионажа: http://www.chekist.ru/article/4885]
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Interestingly, it is to propaganda (understood as a diverse range 
of intelligence instruments) that Batyushin, describing his expe-
riences from the First World War, devotes special attention. The 
goals of propaganda are broadly understood as “raising the spir-
its of one’s own population, for example by trumpeting one’s own 
successes”, as well as “lowering the opponent’s fighting spirit as 
a result of direct actions, or via the agency of third countries”. The 
choice of propaganda objects is not easy, because “one cannot de-
molish the moral foundations of a nation without taking its psy-
chology into account”28. As examples of well-organised Russian 
propaganda, he mentions the long-term Slavophile propaganda, 
conducted through the Slavic Charity Association, which was di-
rected at Poland at the time of the partitions.
The general warns that “the Bolsheviks, who do not skimp on 
money in order to keep the Russian masses in the dark, and the 
Germans, who have systematically re-educated their nation un-
der the direction of their propaganda minister Goebbels, have 
noticed the great importance of propaganda. This is achieved 
through the work of an entire army of propagandists.” This leads 
Batyushin to the conclusion that “the psychological weapon – the 
word – is a tool as powerful as firearms”.
In his reflections on intelligence and counterintelligence, the gen-
eral underlines the importance of “espionage activity in which 
a large circle of people, brought up in a patriotic spirit, represents 
valuable assistance to the services”, which leads to the conclu-
sion that intelligence and counterintelligence (civil and military) 
somehow arose organically out of the political police. Generally 
speaking, Batyushin performed a kind of synthesis of his own ex-
periences and the experiences of the theoreticians of his times. 
This is evidenced by the terminology he uses, borrowed in part 
from the Okhrana (external agent, internal agent), and in part 
from Walter Nicolai, the head of section III-b (intelligence) of the 
28 Н. Батюшин, Тайная военная разведка…, p. 39.
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German General Staff. Like Nicolai, he distinguishes between ac-
tive intelligence and passive intelligence, i.e. counterintelligence. 
In conclusion, Batyushin showed his solidarity with the repre-
sentatives of Europe’s military intelligence corps at that time: as 
he stated, “Gen. Ronge and Colonel Nicolai are figures of historical 
importance in the field of intelligence”.
A characteristic feature: in translating these historical theories 
into contemporary language, Oleg Khlobustov, a lecturer at the 
FSB Academy, identified the term ‘active intelligence’ with the 
term ‘active measures’: 
“In addition to traditional intelligence, whose task is to collect 
information about one’s opponent, his intentions and resources, 
during World War I the countries involved used active intelli-
gence, the essence of which was attempts to influence the oppo-
nent’s plans and intentions, including by methods of disinforma-
tion, propaganda, sabotage, subversion and terror”29.
However while drawing upon tradition, he ignored an essential 
fact: the assumptions and modus operandi of the Tsarist secret ser-
vice were already well-known to the officers of the CheKa and its 
successors (the GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MB, KGB). The Soviet state, 
which treated intelligence as a key element of foreign policy, ap-
plied these methods on an unprecedented scale.
The last years of Tsarist Russia brought disaster to Batyushin. He 
was under arrest during both the revolutions of 1917 as a political 
enemy of Tsarism. The extraordinary anti-espionage commission 
which he supervised detected betrayal at the highest level: the 
threads of a spy scandal and speculative trade in sugar with Ger-
many led to Grigory Rasputin, and this was seen as a plot by the 
Police Department to limit the influence of the Tsar’s favourite. 
29 О. Хлобустов, Разведка и контрразведка Первой мировой войны глазами 
асов шпионажа, op. cit.
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In a fierce information campaign, Batyushin’s commission was dis-
credited and accused of corruption. This was part of the struggle 
between the SR’s Provisional Government and the Tsarist secret 
services – which, by the way, he himself had dissolved. As is em-
phasised today, Batyushin’s escape from custody at the end of 1917 
was assisted by the Bolshevik Vladimir Antonovich-Ovseyenko, 
with whom he had shared a cell. He did not participate in the Civil 
War; he lived in Belgrade, where he gave lectures in military cours-
es, the fruit of which was his aforementioned book. During World 
War II he went to the Netherlands; he died in an old people’s home 
in 1957. In 2004 his ashes were brought to Moscow by the Society 
for the Study of the History of Russian Special Services, supported 
by the Association of Special Service Veterans. In the reporting ac-
companying this event, as well as later media reports on the sub-
ject of Gen. Batyushin, the words of General Aleksander Zdanovich 
were repeated: “a patriot remains a patriot in exile too”30.
30 Сценарий передачи Невидимый фронт, 18 January 2008, http://chekist.
ru/article/1984
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III. A contemporAry sketch: the specIAl 
servIces As A ‘communIty of vIctory’
Towards the end of the existence of the Soviet Union and the KGB, 
the cult of security was severely tarnished: during a demonstra-
tion in August 1991, the statue of the ‘first Chekist’ Feliks Dzer-
zhinsky was removed from its symbolic space. This was related to 
the authorities’ crisis of legitimacy and the radicalisation of soci-
ety after the break-up of the USSR, as the people sought those who 
were responsible for the state of the country. The special services 
quickly emerged from their ideological impotence (their ‘humili-
ation’ after the dissolution of the KGB). In order to blur their un-
comfortable founding myth (the political climate was not condu-
cive to emphasising the role of the special services), they turned 
towards the imperial legacy. Reconciling this with the Soviet leg-
acy turned out to be a long process, one which is still unfinished 
today. This process had already begun in the 1990s: one of its first 
signs was a conference of representatives from the security min-
istries held in 1994 under the slogan ‘A strong Russia needs strong 
special services’, as well as the White Book of the Russian Special 
Services printed after the conference. In its introduction, we read: 
“In times of crisis, the tsar and the ruling circles fighting for in-
fluence were often unable to specify their own political goals or 
the ways of implementing them. At that time, the internal secu-
rity services were forced to demonstrate their political independ-
ence, and set the priorities of their own activities themselves, 
sometimes to the detriment of their own careers, and even of the 
lives of high-ranking state officials and members of the monarch’s 
family. For example, the maintenance of strong undercover posi-
tions in the SRs’ terrorist organisations was considered more im-
portant in the Okhranka than preventing attacks on members of 
the government”31.
31 Белая книга российских спецслужб, Moscow 1995, p. 12.
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This kind of pressure, which increasingly often appeals to a sense of 
historical responsibility for the fate of Russia, was not only a decla-
ration that the special services’ political role was to be revitalised, 
but was also a sign of a change at the summit of power in Russia: one 
of President Putin’s strengths was his ability to ‘listen to the minis-
tries of force’. Boris Yeltsin, especially at the beginning of his presi-
dency, did not enjoy authority among the special services: he often 
criticised them, he reformed the Lubianka three times, he changed 
its leaders seven times. It is not surprising, therefore, that from the 
beginning the pro-Putin campaigns were based on the dichotomy 
of chaos versus stabilisation. The historical legitimisation of the ser-
vices was also meant to restore public trust in them. At that time the 
Foreign Intelligence Service initiated a monumental series of publi-
cations entitled Sketches on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence 
(volume 1, discussing the history of pre-Bolshevik intelligence, was 
published in 1996, and volume 6 in 2006; publication was resumed 
in 2014-17), and the FSB organised an annual conference under the 
name ‘Historical Lectures on the Lubianka’, organised by the Soci-
ety for the Study of the History of Russian Special Services, which 
even today is still lead by Aleksander Zdanovich, the former press 
spokesperson and head of the FSB’s department for communica-
tion with the public, and now a professor of history at the Moscow 
Pedagogical University and a member of the Academy of Military 
Sciences. The active members of the Association are lecturers at 
departmental universities (Oleg Khlobustov, Aleksandr Plekh-
anov, Andrei Plekhanov, Yuri Ovchenko, Oleg Mozokhin, Vladlen 
Izmozik and others), and their articles are regularly published in 
the multi-volume series ‘Works of the Society for the Study of the 
History of Russian Special Services’ and disseminated on specialist 
websites (chekist.ru, lubyanka.org, hrono.ru and others), as well as 
being widely available on social media.
This group laid the foundations for the historical legitimisation of 
the services, which is also a kind of political and ideological didac-
tics, which sustains within society the cult of security, the cult of 
the uniform and of victory. The list of books they have prepared 
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is impressive, although the vast majority of them concern the So-
viet period32, being a continuation of the Soviet historiography of 
the services. This tradition is reconciled with the Tsarist tradition 
through the glorification of selected figures, facts and events from 
the past of the Russian Empire which can be used in a pragmatic 
manner. The project of the historical legitimisation of the special 
services has been included in the wider legitimisation strategy 
of the Russian authorities. During Zdanovich’s presentation of the 
Association’s achievements, he did not hide that “the main crite-
ria of his work are the strengthening of state power and the legal 
order in the Russian Federation.”33 The instrumental treatment of 
the history of Russia’s services, seen through the prism of selected 
events and selected heroes, primarily serves the creation of desira-
ble patterns of public behaviour. This has resulted in a return to ‘the 
sources of success’: Russian culture is not in the habit of discuss-
ing its own failures to any great extent. The historiographers of the 
services invariably demonstrate that the eternal causes of any such 
failures are, on the one hand, the weakness of power and/or the an-
archisation of society, and on the other, the intrigues of external 
forces causing catastrophic shocks in Russia’s history. One result of 
this is the confrontational vision of international relations, as well 
as the confrontational course of Russia’s foreign policy.34
32 For example, see the bibliography of works by Oleg Khlobustov: http://www.
hrono.ru/avtory/hronos/hlobustov.php. Out of interest, it may be mentioned 
that students of the FSB Academy learn, among others, from his repeatedly 
republished book О. Хлобустов, Госбезопасность от Александра I до Путина 
[State security from Alexander I to Putin], Moscow 2005.
33 For more on this, see for example В культурном центре ФСБ состоялась 
презентация Общества изучения истории отечественных спецслужб, РИА 
Новости, 17 December 2001. The Association of Special Service Veterans, in 
turn, stresses on its website that the future of the Russian services depends 
on “the proper understanding by officers of their role in the mechanism of 
power, and in the development of the Russian State and society in various 
historical periods”: http://www.a-lubyanka.ru/page/article/100
34 For more on this subject, see M. Domańska, Conflict-dependent Russia. The 
domestic determinants of the Kremlin’s anti-western policy, “OSW Point of 
View”, nr 67, 6 November 2017: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
point-view/2017-11-06/conflict-dependent-russia-domestic-determinants-
kremlins-anti
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The project of institutional memory places the special services at 
the centre of this confrontation. “Throughout the centuries”, we 
read in the FSB ministerial letter cited above, “covert and overt 
forces inimical to our homeland have manipulated historical 
events, treating this as a way of striking at the authority of the 
Russian state both within the country and on the international 
arena. One of the main targets of the information war against 
Tsarist and Soviet Russia, as well as in contemporary democratic 
Russia, was and remains its state security organs”.35
The new historical identity which the officers of the Russian 
services are being equipped with is eclectic and incoherent; it 
is continually being adapted to the current needs of the regime, 
and is based on the search for common experiences between the 
Tsarist services and those of the Soviet state. Even though the in-
stitutional memory in both traditions (imperial and Soviet) was 
interrupted as a result of the Bolshevik revolution, the principle 
of one-man (autocratic) leadership was emphasised; in both tra-
ditions, the secret services constituted the dominant instrument 
of power, performing functions beyond the role and competences 
of Western services (such as creating political, social, economic 
reality). In both traditions, the authorities’ ideological safeguard 
was the security of the state. In both traditions, all the security 
institutions had the same task as they do today: protecting and 
strengthening the authorities. And in both traditions, the officers 
were recruited from the elite of society; they were ‘the best, the 
most educated and the most patriotic’ of its representatives.
The significance and uniqueness of the Russian services is empha-
sised by an imposed cultural (civilisational) approach to history 
(in Russian, историко-культурный стандард). In this perspec-
tive, “one historical trait of Russian civilisation is, in comparison 
to the West, the higher role of the state, and in effect its security 
35 А. Калганов, В поисках истины, op. cit.
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organs”, as for example writes A. Sushko, a historian from Omsk36. 
“The civilisational approach”, we read further, “explains the role 
of the Russian special services in carrying out necessary modern-
isation, enabling Russian civilisation to respond adequately to ex-
ternal challenges and resolve difficult internal problems”. In the 
cases of the modernisation of Russian society which this author 
cites (during the rules of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Joseph Sta-
lin), this appears as “a state-organised response to the challenges 
and threats [posed] to Russian Orthodox civilisation”.
In accordance with the official interpretation, the historical-cul-
tural standard is intended to serve the unification of the Russian 
Federation’s different nations and cultures, that is, to construct 
a new foundation of historical consciousness in the majority of 
Russian society. In practice, however, it is yet another attempt 
to fill the ideological emptiness left after the fall of Communism, 
from whose heritage the new Russian authorities have never 
clearly cut themselves off. The fundamental (unifying) features of 
Russian civilisation are to be the Russian language, the Orthodox 
community, common historical (war) experiences, and common 
values: patriotism, family, and the security and sovereignty of the 
Russian state.
Ideology has always caused tensions between the visionary and 
reality. One manifestation of this was, and still is, the use of a kind 
of phraseological ‘mutant’ (expressions such as the ‘dictatorship 
of the heart’, ‘police socialism’, the ‘revolutionary rule of law’, the 
36 А. Сушко, К вопросу об использовании цивилизационного подхода для 
изучения истории отечественных спецслужб, http://www.rummuseum.
info/node/5804. It is worth noting that this approach lies at the foundation 
of the historical and cultural standard for the teaching of history in Russia. 
Its development continued in a project revived in 2012 by the Russian His-
torical Society, which is headed by Sergei Naryshkin, the current head of the 
Foreign Intelligence Service [https://historyrussia.org]. Incidentally, in the 
proposed standard, both the revolutions of 1917 were united in a single ‘Great 
Russian Revolution’, while Stalinism was described with the euphemistic 
phrase ‘the Soviet way to modernisation’.
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‘new nobility’, ‘Orthodox Chekism’, the ‘dictatorship of the law’ 
and others). These expressions are illogical, incoherent; they ap-
pear and disappear like ephemera, but they have a practical value: 
characterised by emotional pathos, they are used as arguments in 
the ideological struggle. These transitory, unstable notions testify 
first of all to the successive ideological reversals that characterise 
the authorities’ new legitimisation strategy. In 2000, this strategy 
was based on the ‘dictatorship of the law’ and the ‘new nobility’, 
and in 2008, during the initial period of Dmitri Medvedev’s presi-
dency, on ‘liberal modernisation’. During Putin’s previous term 
as president (2012-2018), a mobilisation strategy emerged based 
on the militarisation of society and the military organisation of 
the state. The officers of the special services were included in the 
defence system, and were presented in the symbolic space as de-
fenders of the homeland, thus becoming the beneficiaries of the 
victory cult prevailing within it. In fact, as always, it was a mat-
ter of strengthening the mechanisms for the crisis-period, emer-
gency rule of Russia, its security, economy and society. Today, it 
has been inscribed in the mobilising model of the state, which has 
also absorbed a vast cultural, informational, educational sphere 
of ideas. It is being implemented by all the ministries of force, led 
by the Ministry of Defence, which in the symbolic sense has the 
most resources for the patriotic education of society which must 
take place in the public space. Hence the conclusion that their 
high position is primarily determined by Russian authoritarian-
ism. This position is not endangered, because the sense of threat 
to the ruling team’s interests will continue to rise. This will prob-
ably create a need for new forms and measures to protect the sta-
tus quo, which will be presented as the defence of the neo-imperial 
statehood of Russia.
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summAry
Exploring the mechanisms by which Russia’s modern secret ser-
vices function is not an easy task. In accordance with Russian le-
gal culture, this is a hermetic system, in which the scope of infor-
mation protected as strict secrets of the state is definitely broader 
than in the West. At the same time, we are dealing here with 
a certain informational paradox. The media provides practically 
daily reports about the services, almost exclusively reporting 
their successes: detecting successive cases of espionage, thwart-
ing terrorist attacks, detecting more cases of corruption, crimes 
committed by enemies of the regime, combating political extrem-
ism, etc., etc. Public opinion, historiography and sectoral analyses 
emphasise their instrumental force in the political, economic and 
social processes taking place in Russia. The services’ heads pre-
sent them as a ‘community of successes’, and they astonish public 
opinion with their openness. Sergei Naryshkin, appointed head 
of the Foreign Intelligence Service at the end of 2016, has already 
given several interviews; he has been the protagonist of several 
TV reports, showing his office and the mysterious corridors of 
the SVR’s headquarters in Yasenevo, amazing millions of view-
ers with the openness and exceptional achievements of Russian 
intelligence (for example, on the occasion of the 95th anniversary 
of Department S, the ‘illegals’, which was celebrated in 2017).
This kind of presence for the Russian special services in the pub-
lic space causes cognitive dissonance, because the declared real-
ity is at odds with the true reality. This is particularly evident in 
the example of the façade of Russian legalism. Regardless of how 
the normative reality is portrayed, a real, ‘grey’ reality does exist. 
The right to conceal information about the services is overused: 
as a result, the broad sphere of state secrets serves not only the 
services’ statutory goals, but also their extra-statutory actions 
(exerting influence on political, economic and social phenomena), 
and as a cover for their entrepreneurship. Moreover, the concept 
of ‘state secrets’ has expanded to include political and business 
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arrangements in which former officers and those fighting for 
influence within the ruling circles participate. As a result, the 
function of ‘political guardian of the status quo’ collides with the 
function of ‘law enforcement officer’. The Russian system causes 
conflict by its very nature, but the majority of these conflicts are 
hushed up, as consistently accounting for such scandals would 
jeopardise the image of the state and its apparatus. The declared 
historical memory, national identity, historical and cultural 
standards are also mainly questions of public image. They are top-
down, superficial and imitative in nature. Basically, they are not 
so much concerned with laying the foundations for a particular 
idea, but rather about shaping desired attitudes.
Understanding these mechanisms requires the separation of his-
torical propaganda as a key element of Russian manipulation tech-
nology from the real historical facts as interpreted in accordance 
with generally adopted methodology. Meanwhile, the history of 
the Russian services teaches us that their position has always de-
pended on the supreme authority in the state. The crises which 
led to the delegitimisation of the government (in 1917 and 1991) re-
sulted in crises within the service: deprived of a decision-maker, 
they felt helpless, ‘degraded’, deprived of their strategic mission. 
At the same time, for centuries they were a key instrument for 
the rulers who needed the support of a coercive apparatus as a pil-
lar of their power. President Putin does not treat the services any 
differently: depending on the regime’s current needs, he reforms 
the services, appoints and dissolves them (such as the Federal 
Drug Control Service or the Federal Service of the National Guard 
Army). At the same time, without inhibitions, he grants them new 
powers, including those that allow them to interfere in the sphere 
of civic rights and freedoms.
The context of the Russian services’ historical memory is also im-
portant for understanding the specific security culture of the Rus-
sian Federation, or rather its strategic culture. Generally, this can 
be characterised as the culture of extraordinary situations and 
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the culture of hierarchical subordination. This is deeply rooted in 
the consciousness of Russian society, and is based, among others, 
on the following elements:
1.	 the deep tradition of autocracy as the main principle of social 
order and social mentality: the Tsar or the ‘first person in the 
state’ is the ‘guardian’ of his subjects;
2.	 society’s consent to the use of violence in the name of supe-
rior political goals: the ‘rule of a strong hand’ is equated with 
‘order in the country’, and the stability of the constitutional 
order with the stability of the system of power;
3.	 the axiom that the overriding value of the state is to be a su-
perpower, which is the source of the mythologisation of the 
special services and the army;
4.	 the belief in extraordinary goals in extraordinary circum-
stances – this is connected with the right of the coercive appa-
ratus to apply extraordinary security measures, whereupon 
these measures, which are exacerbated in crisis situations, 
become the norm;
5.	 fixed propaganda narratives that on the one hand, Russia is 
destined for greatness, and on the other, that it is surrounded 
by enemies, which serves to maintain the siege psychosis;
6.	 the passivity of the citizens, whom the authorities constantly 
mobilise to repel external aggression; and at the same time 
their susceptibility to social engineering, which is the result 
of the ‘incapacitation’ of society.
In this context, the pedigree and traditionalist culture of the Rus-
sian services should be derived from the legacy of the authoritar-
ian police state.
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This manifests itself in
(1) the mental sphere,
(2) the organisational sphere and
(3) the technical sphere (modus operandi).
It results from centuries of the mutual dependence between the 
authorities and the apparatus of state violence: the use of force 
was the basic tool for achieving the state’s political, economic and 
social goals. Traditionalism, in the activity of the Russian special 
services, is a derivative of the authoritarian police regime. In ad-
dition to the typical universal functions of the services (guard-
ians of the law, informational, control and preventive functions), 
they also fulfil the function of legitimising the system, as well as 
the resulting function of ‘moderation’, which consists in creating 
the phenomena and behaviours desired by the regime.
The timeless manifestations of this are:
(1)	in	the	mental	sphere:
 – defining threats: the spectre of the delegitimisation of power and 
the radicalisation of society are more dangerous than, for exam-
ple, the state’s economic collapse; as a result, the primary task 
of the security sector is to isolate/protect society from external 
influences (ideologically this justifies the vision of a hostile en-
vironment, as well as the characteristic mythology of plots, fifth 
columns, foreign interventions, psychological warfare, etc.);
 – the visible servility of the security sector;
 – the conviction that it is essential to continually consolidate so-
ciety through indoctrination: continuous use of the image of 
the enemy, the physical and symbolic persecution of the los-
ers (the Whites, fascists, reactionaries, and the liberals, who 
today embody the intransigent opposition);
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 – maintaining the citizens’ fear of and respect towards the ap-
paratus of coercion, which results mainly from the authori-
tarian regime’s fear of revolt;
 – the services’ emphasis on their role in maintaining the stabil-
ity and sovereignty of the state; their participation in imple-
menting state projects, for example in Russia’s information 
warfare against the West.
(2)	in	the	organisational	sphere:
 – centralisation: strict subordination to the central government 
based on vertical top-down relations. The services’ hierarchical 
territorial structure (the central apparatus, regional, district 
and neighbourhood committees) enables structural control;
 – the President’s constitutional monopoly on appointing and 
dissolving services, and on directing them;
 – the services’ organisational and jurisdictional structure, ena-
bling not only independence in the statutory sphere, but also 
their extra-statutory activity, as an instrument for imple-
menting the changing political needs of the state leadership; 
building the potential to adapt to new tasks;
 – the services’ high institutional rank as autonomously man-
aged organs of executive power, superior to other central and 
local organs of executive power and local self-government;
 – the absence of public control over the activities of the services 
or the financial resources allocated to their activities;
 – counterintelligence and intelligence tasks are secondary to their 
policing function and the function of supporting the authorities 
in government/community relations and home/abroad relations 
(hence the overriding role of the FSB as ‘first among equals’);
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 – focusing on quantity rather than quality, leading to bureau-
cratic excesses and bureaucratic internal reporting;
 – organisational solutions enabling the services’ mutual supervi-
sion, such as the location of military counterintelligence within 
the structures of the main civilian security service (FSB).
(3)	in	the	sphere	of	modus operandi
 – a vast area of extra-statutory activities that go beyond the 
competences of the secret services;
 – the use of different methods according to the public mood: 
extraordinary measures (preventive arrests, supervision 
through infiltration), command-and-administrative methods 
(summoning citizens for warning interviews), building up 
networks of informers and stimulating denunciations, etc.;
 – varied instruments in the confrontation between Russia and 
the West; the long tradition of using informational and psy-
chological warfare (disinformation operations), methods of 
espionage, provocation, sabotage and terrorist methods;
 – the repressive nature of statutory and non-statutory activities 
(‘the stick and the knout’ as a symbol of enforcing both obedi-
ence and reporting information);
 – the so-called state/private partnership, enabling the use of the 
services’ own resources as well as those of private entities;
 – a long tradition of liquidating opponents of the regime (bo-
yars, rebels, terrorists, foreign agents);
 – working under a foreign flag, through intermediaries.
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